Gabriele Cosentino

Media, Culture & Global Politics

Tag: politics

  • Fascism in Football: How the Beautiful Game Turned Ugly

    Fascism in Football: How the Beautiful Game Turned Ugly

    Far-right politics have found mainstream attention among Italian football fans

    Photo Credits: Reuters


    December 26, 2018 was supposed to be an exciting day for Italian football fans: it was the first time matches of the top national league, Serie A, were scheduled during the Christmas holidays, to add some sports fun to the festive season. The big match of the day was Inter Milan vs Napoli, a classic face-off between two of the most prominent teams in Italy. The post-match TV coverage, however, did not dwell on scored goals or athletic feats, but rather on the violent riots among Inter and Napoli fans that left one man dead. 

    During the riots, Daniele Belardinelli, a supporter of the Italian team Varese, was mowed down by an SUV driven by a Napoli fan. Belardinelli was an ultrà, a slang term used to identify hardcore football fans, in Italy and across Europe. Ultras are a fixture of Italian football, well known for expressing their diehard fandom through colorful, sometimes scurrilous chants and highly choreographic banners. Unfortunately, they are also notorious for their racist and violent behavior and, increasingly, engagement in political extremism and illegal activities. 

    While some ultras groups subscribe to progressive or leftist ideology, the great majority lean to the far-right. Often, groups supporting different teams form bonds along ideological lines. Ultras of Varese and Inter are both far-right oriented and have a long history of political alignment and mutual support. Belardinelli had joined fans of Inter Milan in an ambush against a busload of Napoli fans. Despite the attack’s careful planning—which managed to defy the police intervention—he was caught off guard by the car that rammed into the crowd of Inter fans and took his life.

    The Growing Presence of Fascism in Football Fans

    This was not the first time that an ultra had died in clashes among rival supporters, a history of violence dating back to the late 1970s that has left a trail of victims (23 deaths over the last four decades). But the death of Belardinelli—who was a key member of a neo-nazi group of Varese supporters called Blood and Honor—put a spotlight on the recent infiltration of neo-fascist and neo-nazi groups among Italian football fans, as well as on their networks of affiliates across Italy and Europe. 

    The fans of Inter and Varese—with further support of another group of extremists hailing from Nice, France—had launched the attack against the Napolitaneans not simply because of a football rivalry, but to advance their racist and far-right political agenda. Napoli are a team from Southern Italy, traditionally a target of racist attacks by northern Italian ultras, and one of their star players at the time was  Kalidou Koulibaly, a Senegalese defender who had often been at the receiving end of racist taunts and insults for his skin color by ultras groups across Italy. 

    Blood and Honor are part of a galaxy of neo-nazi groups active in northern Italy, originally emanating from the UK and with a strong presence in Germany. While small in number, they have cast an outsized shadow among Varese fans for years. Blood and Honor—a name that is an explicit reference to a motto used by the infamous paramilitary group SS in Nazi Germany—had waged a campaign against the team signing players of color, vandalized the team stadium, engaged in criminal activities, and clashed with the police on various occasions. 

    As extreme as they might appear, the far-right ultras from Varese are not an exception. Veneto Fronte Skinheads, the largest and best organized xenophobic and anti-semitic group in Italy, has been part of the ultras group of Verona Football Club since the late 1980s. When Verona acquired its first player of African descent in the mid 1990s , far-right ultras staged a protest donning Ku Klux Klan style attire while holding a dark-skinned puppet hanging from a noose. Members of the Veneto Fronte Skinheads have also staged attacks and protests against charity or progressive organizations in Verona assisting migrants and refugees.

    Fans of the Lazio team—the second most popular team in Rome—are also notorious for their fascist sympathies and have strong ties with the far-right organization Forza Nuova. In 2013 and 2017, Lazio fans distributed stickers and posters throughout Rome carrying a doctored image of the well-known known Holocaust victim and writer Anne Frank, pictured wearing a jersey of AS Roma, Lazio’s main rival. The image was meant to taunt Roma fans through an obvious anti-semitic message. Anti-semitic tropes are part and parcel of Lazio ultras’ lore, many of whom never renounced their allegiance to the legacy of Italian fascism and its involvement with the Holocaust during World War II. On a recent occasion in 2024, Lazio supporters in Germany sang fascist songs at the Hofbrauhaus am Platzl, the pub where Adolf Hitler announced the founding of the Nazi Party.

    While other teams—including major ones such as Inter, Juventus and AC Milan—have more moderate right-wing supporters than Verona or Lazio, far-right politics have made significant inroads into their fan groups in the past decades. Inter fans have increasingly drifted towards more radical positions, while also interacting with powerful organized crime cartels, such as Ndrangheta from the Calabria region. As a result, most ultras in Italy have displayed openly racist or bigoted behavior during football matches since the early 2000s: booing or mocking players of African descent, displaying anti-semitic and Islamophobic messages, expressing transphobic or anti-LGBTQ messages, or even parading symbols reminiscent of the Nazi or Fascist era, such as the Swastika or the Celtic Cross.  

    How Far-Right Politics Found a Foothold in Italy (Again)

    Until a decade ago, the impact and influence of far right ultras on the broader Italian culture and politics was limited. Openly racist comments or displaying controversial symbols such as the fascist salute were generally frowned upon and in some cases even sanctioned or prosecuted. Paolo Di Canio—a Lazio player unapologetic about his fascist sympathies—received strong backlash for his frequent use of the fascist salute and his endorsement of far right politics during his professional career in the early 2000s, both in Italy and in England

    Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the Italian political establishment and public opinion firmly rejected the radical messaging and agenda of far-right movements, parties, and personalities, who were de-facto ostracized. The trauma brought on by two decades of totalitarian fascist rule and by War World II left deep scars in the collective psyche of the country, and laws were enacted to prevent the reestablishment of fascist parties and the display of fascist symbols. 

    However, after the 1992 Tangentopoli corruption scandal and the following collapse of the party system that ruled post-war Italy, far-right and neo-fascist parties exploited the political vacuum to reenter the political sphere. Furthermore, in Italy as in other countries in Europe, unexpected cultural shifts triggered by globalization at the turn of the millennium brought on a return of political and cultural conservatism and nationalism, creating a hospitable climate for the resurfacing of far-right politics. Nostalgic or positive views on the fascist era—once considered taboo—gradually crept back into the public sphere and were met with less backlash, or even openly espoused.  

    As a result, since the beginning of the 21st century, far-right politicians and movements have made significant gains in local and national elections. This trend has become especially visible since the late 2010s, culminating with the appointment of Giorgia Meloni as Prime Minister in 2022, member of the far right party Fratelli d’Italia (a national-conservative and right-wing populist party). Meloni, who in her youth belonged to neo-fascist and far-right organizations, has never completely condemned fascism.

    Ultras groups have also become involved in far-right politics. Activists belonging to Inter Milan ultras have campaigned for Fratelli d’Italia politician Carlo Fidanza—recently involved in a corruption scandal—in the 2019 European elections. Following the mainstreaming of previously fringe political ideas in Italian society, far-right ultras have seen their influence increase, expanding their power in the organization of club fan bases and engaging in a plurality of business activities adjacent to football matches, such as the illegal or unregulated sale of tickets, fast food, or merchandise outside of the stadium.

    The Politicization of Sport in Italy

    Italy is not completely unprepared for an overlap between politics and football. Such an interpenetration of the two spheres has already happened, and has taken many forms. For instance, the use of football to advance a far-right political agenda in the country can actually be traced back to Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, who turned the 1934 World Cup into a propaganda tool to promote his National Fascist Party. In this sense, far-right politics and football in Italy go a long way back.  The final match of the 1934 World Cup—won by Italy—was played in a stadium in Rome dedicated to the National Fascist Party.

    The Italian team performs a fascist salute before the 1934 World Cup Final in Rome. Photo: Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty

    More recently, the late Silvio Berlusconi was for many years both the Italian prime minister and the president of AC Milan, one of Italy’s most successful football clubs. Berlusconi was a football and media tycoon-cum-politician that brought many significant innovations to Italian politics. He was able to create an unprecedented synergy among his media, football, and political enterprises, turning his successful persona into a broader ‘brand’ that allowed his football fans to merge with his voters, and vice versa. The very name of his political party, Forza Italia, was inspired by chants by fans of the Italian national football team. 

    Milan team celebrate with the trophy at the end of the 2007 Champions League with former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi (Action Images / Michael Regan)

    While a center-right conservative, Berlusconi was a shrewd politician who was responsible for the re-legitimization of far-right parties. On multiple occasions, he created political coalitions with far-right parties such as Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord and Fratelli d’Italia, gradually allowing them to gain more national exposure and legitimacy. Meanwhile, Berlusconi actively contributed to the politicization of football by frequently using expressions and metaphors from the sport (famously, his political debut in 1994 was framed as an ‘entrance into the football arena’), and boasting about his AC Milan’s victories during political debates.

    While the Berlusconi era of ‘football politics’ effectively ended in 2013 with the electoral defeat of his party and the later sale of AC Milan club, his broader legacy can still be felt in Italy. His anti-socialist views, patriarchal attitude, and nationalist outlook have left an imprint on Italian society and culture, which over the past decade has drifted to the right

    The growing clout of far-right fans in the broader community of football lovers in Italy has also begun to creep into the supporters of the Italian national team. Aside from its use as a tool for propaganda in the fascist era, the national team has traditionally been associated with a very mainstream and moderate type of football fandom. Matches of the national team—Azzurri, meaning ‘the blue ones’, from the color of the jersey—were occasions for the whole country to join together and overcome social or political fissures. The World Cup victory in 1982 is still remembered as a joyous moment of celebration that helped the country heal from the political troubles and ideological divisions of the 1970s. 

    Recently, however, a group of supporters of the national team calling itself Ultras Italia has made headlines for displaying the fascist salute, donning coordinated black shirts—reminiscent of the black shirts worn by armed militias during the fascist era—and criticizing players of mixed African-Italian heritage. Hailing primarily from the South of Italy and well-connected with groups of supporters residing abroad, the rising profile of Ultras Italia shows that a far-right leaning is not just a feature of ultras of individual clubs, but has also reached the fan base of the national team.

    Fascism Grows in Football Across Europe

    While far-right politics have been a trait of the football fandom in Italy for several decades, it is only recently that the radical agenda and discourse of ultras has found a more receptive public opinion and political leaders who represent and amplify their views and rhetoric to a wider audience. A similar alignment between far-right football fans and politicians can be also seen in the UK, another country with a long and troubled history of football hooliganism. 

    A case in point is Reform UK, the far-right party expected to be the main challenger to the incumbent Labour Party at the next general election. Led by controversial politician Nigel Farage—a fervent supporter of Donald Trump and a key figure behind the Brexit referendum—Reform UK has gained traction because of its strong anti-immigration rhetoric. As Reform UK has risen in the polls, British flags carrying the phrase ‘Stop the Boats’ (referencing a UK government policy to decrease boat crossings by asylum seekers) have started to appear at matches of the England national team, while fans distributed stickers bearing the motto “On the charge with Nigel Farage”. 

    England fan wearing a Nigel Farage face mask inside stadium (REUTERS/John Sibley)

    The last and most troublesome aspect of the overlap between football fans and far right extremists is that football stands are becoming grounds—in Italy and elsewhere in Europe—where young people are groomed and recruited to join far right organizations and militias. Taking advantage of the excitement and passion that the youth has for their favourite teams, extremists with neo-fascist and neo-nazi agendas can exploit vulnerable people and entice them to join their ranks. 

    By dangerously embracing far-right politics, football fans are allowing into the arena racism, bigotry, and even violence, turning the beautiful game into an ugly spectacle. If this trend continues, it will be a loss for everyone who loves football and a threat for society at large.

    Part of The Cairo Review of Global Affairs special issue “The Rise of the Right”:

  • TikTok in Egypt: Where Rich and Poor Meet – and the State Watches Everything

    TikTok in Egypt: Where Rich and Poor Meet – and the State Watches Everything

    Khaled Desouki/AFP/Getty Images

    Published in The Conversation

     

    After being released from detention in 2011, Egyptian engineer and activist Wael Ghonim told the media:

    If you want to liberate a society, all you need is the internet.

    He’d been taken into custody for his role in the revolution that toppled the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Part of the success of this unprecedented popular uprising was due to the role of social media in mobilising citizens around a common political cause.

    In 2025, after a decade under the repressive government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, it’s fair to say that little has remained of Ghonim’s vision. Social media use in Egypt is closely guarded by the authorities to detect signs of opposition. Citizens are routinely detained, even for the slightest criticism of the government.

    In 2018 Egypt introduced a new law, apparently to curb the problem of online misinformation and disinformation. This law is, in reality, often used to stifle dissent. Egyptians today operate within unclear boundaries of what is permissible to say online. The result is widespread self-censorship for fear of arrest.

    As a scholar of political communication and new media I’ve written books on global social media. I teach students about the social and political impact of digital and social media in Egypt. The video sharing platform TikTok is a frequent subject in my classes because it reveals both the liberating and the repressive effects of social media use in Egypt.

    TikTok stands out for its ability to create viral videos and sudden micro-celebrities. This has made it a lightning rod for government crackdowns. But it has also connected people across socio-economic divides and bred a lively new cultural and political debate – one that’s not as easy for the government to police.

    TikTok in Egypt

    Since 2020, TikTok has become immensely popular in Egypt, with an estimated 33 million users over 18 years old.

    While TikTok hasn’t taken on the explicit political dimension that Facebook or Twitter did over a decade ago, it has already become the theatre of a series of incidents that have landed its users in the crosshairs of the authorities. This has exposed political rifts and tensions.

    People in a crowd, a hand holds up a placard that reads
     
    Facebook was the prominent social media during the revolution. Sherif9282/Wikimedia Commons

    Most of the incidents are related to the ability of TikTok to work as a “virality engine” – even users with few followers can gain a sudden and sometimes problematic celebrity.

    But while Egyptian authorities have evidently been cracking down on TikTok users, there have been no concrete plans to ban the platform. In fact, some government branches have used it to advance their own initiatives. The Ministry of Youth and Sports, for example, signed an agreement with TikTok to launch the Egyptian TikTok Creator Hub, designed to educate youth on using social media responsibly.

    Women targeted

    Since 2020, Egyptian authorities have arrested TikTok users under charges ranging from the violation of family values to the spread of false information and allegations of belonging to terrorist organisations. Most of these TikTokers didn’t post explicit sexual or political content, making the charges against them appear exaggerated. These cases suggest the authorities are closely monitoring the platform, following strict moral and political considerations.

    The most high profile cases have involved young women, most notably Haneen Hossam and Mawada Eladham, who were arrested in 2020 for violating family values. Article 25 of Egypt’s anti-cybercrime law states that content “violating the family principles and values upheld by Egyptian society may be punished by a minimum of six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine”. It leaves the definition of family values purposefully vague.

    Observers have noted that this vagueness has allowed the law to be applied in a range of different cases. More than a dozen women have faced similar charges, endured pretrial detention and been handed lengthy prison sentences.

    The arbitrary nature of many of the charges suggests a possible deeper motive: policing the presence of young women in digital spaces where they can gain influence and financial independence outside traditional family or work structures.

    TikTok has given ordinary users in Egypt unprecedented visibility, in some cases allowing them to challenge social norms, often through humour. This appears to have unsettled authorities, who appear to have sought to send a message to the broader population.

    Arrests

    TikTok-related arrests have not been limited to family values. In 2022, three users were arrested for criticising rising food prices. They were charged with spreading fake news, despite the fact that inflation in Egypt was rising sharply.

    In 2023, a parody skit of a fake jail visit by a TikToker went viral. The creators were arrested and charged with belonging to a terror organisation, spreading fake news and misusing social media.

    Such arrests indicate that TikTok content that touches on politically sensitive matters, even in jest, is posing a new type of challenge for the Egyptian government. The state is particularly concerned with viral content that might bring attention to its poor human rights record. This includes notoriously bad conditions in jails.

    ‘Egypt’ and ‘Masr’

    At the same time, the platform is proving able to connect people from very different social and economic backgrounds, as it is seen to do globally.

    Egypt is very hierarchical. Small, affluent elite groups live in a separate and secluded socio-economic reality from the majority of the population. Thirty percent of Egyptians live under the poverty line.

    On TikTok, the more privileged, cosmopolitan section of society is referred to as “Egypt”. The poor and disenfranchised are “Masr” (مصر), the Arabic word for Egypt.

    TikTok is aimed at generating viral content more than it is a networking site, like Facebook, that’s based on pre-existing social connections. The result is a virtual common space where the two sides can interact in new ways. This engenders unique social and cultural dynamics also observed in other countries.

    “Egypt” watches “Masr” create all kinds of content – from singing and dancing routines to live begging. “Masr” gets to peek into the otherwise inaccessible world of the wealthy.

    In the current climate of an economic crisis, this divide can be glaring. While most Egyptians are struggling with inflation, the cost of living and unemployment, the wealthy flaunt their lifestyles on TikTok.

    When wealthy TikTokers post content complaining about relatively petty issues like a long wait for valet parking at a luxury restaurant or boast about their weekly allowance, it reveals their disconnect from the everyday hardships faced by the less privileged.

    Users are able to comment freely on each other’s videos, sharing their unvarnished opinions. A student boasting about their weekly allowance of 3,000 EGP (US$60) might be told, “This is some people’s monthly salary.”

    Political consequences

    Since it first appeared in 2020, TikTok in Egypt has evolved from a platform mainly geared towards silly and entertaining content by teenagers. It’s become an outlet for people of all ages interested in gathering information, keeping abreast of current trends and events, and also a space for political engagement, especially on the issue of Palestine.

    There hasn’t been an obvious politicisation of TikTok in Egypt yet and there might never be, given the strict policing by authorities. But TikTok’s ability to expose divisions in Egyptian society and connect citizens across demographic cleavages could potentially have unexpected political consequences in the near future.

    Shahd Atef contributed to the research for this article

  • From Pizzagate to the Great Replacement: The Globalization of Conspiracy Theories

    From Pizzagate to the Great Replacement: The Globalization of Conspiracy Theories


    (Image credit: Illustrated | antpk/iStock, New York State Sex Offender Registry via AP, File, AP Photo/ Evan Vucci, MARTIN BUREAU/AFP via Getty Images, UshakovD/iStock)

    This chapter from my monograph Social Media and The Post-Truth World Order discusses the global circulation of conspiracy theories, with a special emphasis on fictional political narratives originating from Internet message boards and discussion forums.

    Specifically, the focus of the analysis is on conspiracy theories alleging plots by global liberal elites or progressive movements, popular among White supremacists and far-right circles. The chapter attempts to trace a profile of the most popular conspiracy theories currently dominating the discourse among users of fringe spaces of the Internet, especially 4chan, 8chan and Reddit.

    Such on-line conversations, often cloaked in ironic language, emerge from a subcultural milieu that has been conducive to acts of on-line harassment as well as of violence and terrorism. The 2016 Pizzagate conspiracy theory is presented as the blueprint for fictional political narratives growing out of the contributions of multiple authors in various world regions. 

    The QAnon conspiracy theory, an offshoot of Pizzagate, is also presented as an open-ended collective narrative based on paranoid attitudes toward political institutions and establishments, typical of the current era of Internet driven populism and radical politics. The chapter also discusses how the conspiracy theories under examination functioned as outlets for the collective elaboration of unaddressed political scandals.

    In the second part of the chapter, the ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy theory is discussed as a narrative of victimization of people of White ethnicity, serving as an ideological framework for a growing wave of violent actions by White nationalists worldwide.

    The on-line communications of White terrorists are brought under examination as they crystallize many aesthetic, cultural and ideological elements common to other on-line subcultures and movements mobilizing around claims of marginalization and dispossession. Memes and other elements of Internet popular culture are discussed as ideologically charged resources of on-line culture wars. Reference to post-truth theory is offered throughout the chapter to place the discussion of on-line conspiracy theories within the broader conceptual framework presented in the book’s introduction.

    Full chapter: